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Canadian Bank Unionism 
Perspectives and Issues 
Allen PONAK 
and 
Larry F. MOORE 
Thispaper aims atproviding an adéquate foundation for ad-
dressing practical and theoretical industrial relations issues likely 
to be important to the banking industry in the future. 
In a precedent-setting 1977 décision the Canada Labour Relations 
Board (CLRB) permitted unionization of chartered banks on a branch-by-
branch basis1. Prior to the Board's ruling, it had been widely presumed that 
bank employées, in order to win certification, would hâve to organize on a 
much broader basis, i.e. regionally, provincially, or even nationally. The 
unwillingness and/or inability of established unions to undertake an 
organizing drive of that magnitude combined with the absence of any con-
certed self-organization efforts on the part of bankworkers themselves left 
Canadian banks almost completely non-union. 
The only exception to this non-union situation was the Montréal City 
and District Savings Bank whose 1 000 employées had been organized by 
the Office and Professional Employées International Union (OPEIU) in 
1967. The relatively small size of the City and District2, its location exclu-
sively in Québec, and its savings bank status distinguished it from other 
banks. Partly as a resuit, the unionization of the City and District did not 
act as a spur to union activity elsewhere. Similarly, the organization of a 
number of crédit unions across the country3 produced no démonstration ef-
fect which bank workers identified with and sought to emulate. 
• PONAK, A., Visiting Professor, Faculty of Management, McGill University. 
MOORE, L.F., Associate Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administra-
tion, University of British Columbia. 
** This research was funded by the Canada Department of Labour, University Research 
Committee. 
î Canada Labour Relations Board, Décision "90, June 10, 1977. Service Office and 
Retail Workers Union of Canada and Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce. 
2 The City and District had assets of $430 millions in 1967, the year it was unionized, 
and $1.2 billion in 1977. For a comparison of thèse figures with other Canadian financial in-
stitutions, see The Canada Year Book, various years. 
3 Records of the British Columbia Central Crédit Union. 
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Following the 1977 CLRB décision half-a-dozen unions and the Cana-
dian Labour Congress (CLC) launched major bank campaigns. This activi-
ty produced unionized branches in every part of the country and in ail ma-
jor banks, but bank unionism clearly remains in its infancy. Certifications 
resulting from the first three years of intensive organizing total slightly 
more than 1004, thus accounting for only a tiny proportion of the approxi-
mately 7 000 bank branches in Canada. 
Nevertheless, union organizers remain optimistic. They suggest that 
certain factors not présent in the past, and that go beyond the CLRB déci-
sion, make bank employées unusually union prone at this time5, First, the 
feminist movement of the 1970's is cited as a factor that has made the pre-
dominantly female bank work force less willing to accept the truncated 
career progression and low salary levels6 long associated with bank employ-
ment for women. It is not a coincidence that the initial breakthrough among 
bank workers was made by the strongly feminist-oriented Service, Office, 
and Retail Workers Union of Canada (SORWUC). Second, the automation 
that bank are undergoing may be fostering feelings of insecurity and uncer-
tainty among employées. Workers often find technological change threat-
ening and thus become more réceptive to union promises that collective bar-
gaining will provide added protection. Third, the widespread adoption of 
collective bargaining by white collar workers in the public sector in the last 
ten years may hâve reduced the stigma white collar employées in gênerai 
hâve attached to unionism. Employées in large private sector bureaucracies, 
such as banks, may be much more réceptive to unionism as a resuit. 
Therefore, despite its infancy, bank unionism has provoked a great 
deal of interest among industrial relations scholars, practitioners, and 
policy makers. Beyond an obvious interest in whether banking unionism 
will become widespread, concern is évident about the kind of impact that 
even a union challenge will exercise on bank opérations, about the implica-
tions of success or failure for the Canadian labour movement, and regar-
ding the extent to which work stoppages might inconvenience the public. 
For researchers, great potential exists for exploring a host of important sub-
jects ranging from why workers organize to managerial response mecha-
nisms, particularly in light of the piecemeal, branch-by-branch organizing 
pattern which seems to be emerging. 
4 Records of the Canada Labour Relations Board. 
5 The foregoing discussion is based on discussions with union représentatives, union 
organizing literature, newspaper and magazine articles, and The Bank Book Collective, An Ac-
count to Settle, Vancouver, Press Gang Publishers, 1979. 
6 BOSSEN, Marianne, "Manpower Utilization in Canadian Chartered Banks", Study 
of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, Ottawa, Information Canada, 
1971; Marianne BOSSEN, Employment in Chartered Banks: 1969-1975, Study sponsored by 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women and Canadian Bankers' Association, 1976. 
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Despite this interest, however, relatively little information currently is 
available with respect to industrial relations actors, the légal framework, 
bargaining structure, or a potential "web of rules". In other words, the ma-
jor éléments of the labour-management system7 in banking hâve yet to be 
systematically examined. The primary objective of this paper is to provide 
an adéquate foundation for addressing practical and theoretical industrial 
relations issues likely to be important to the banking industry in the future. 
The analysis is divided into five parts. The first four sections détail: 1) the 
employment environment in banking; 2) the CLRB décision to permit single 
branch bargaining units; 3) early organizing patterns and the record of key 
participants; and 4) a sample of bank collective agreements as well as con-
tracts negotiated in Canadian crédit unions and trust companies and banks 
in the United States. The fifth and final section of the paper draws attention 
to several spécifie issues which warrant attention and suggests ways in which 
thèse issues might be treated. 
THE EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Federally chartered banks in Canada together employ over 150,000 
people8. "Near banks" such as crédit unions, trust and mortgage com-
panies, and provincially chartered savings institutions (e.g. Province of 
Alberta Treasury Branches) bring the number of people engaged in banking 
services to more than 175,0009. The largest five banks clearly are dominant 
accounting for 65 percent of the bank work force and three-quarters of total 
assets10. 
Nationwide branch Systems characterize Canadian banking. The Royal 
Bank of Canada, for example, has over 1,500 branches in virtually every 
part of the country11. In most of the banks, individual branches average 
slightly less than twenty employées but may hâve as few as five employées in 
some cases. At the other extrême a "main branch'' can employ several hun-
dred workers. Figure 1 represents an actual organization chart of a 
25-person branch of one of the major banks12. While job titles vary from 
bank to bank, Figure 1 illustrâtes the basic organization of a typical larger-
than-average branch. 
7 DUNLOP, John, Industrial Relations Systems, New York, Holt, 1958. 
8 The Canadian Bankers' Association, Factbook, 1979-80, p. 6. 
9 Crédit Unions alone employ 25 000 people. See Statistics Canada, Catalogue 61-209, 
The Crédit Unions. 
10 Thèse figures are estimâtes and are based on data obtained from the following 
sources: Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Présentation by the Canadian 
Bankers' Association, Dec. 1975, p. 15; and Canada Year Book. 
il FinancialPost, September 1, 1979, p. 1. 
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Branch Management 
Normally, a branch manager and an accountant (in some banks the ac-
countant is referred to as branch administrative officer or administrative 
manager) constitute the managerial component at the branch level. Larger 
branches, such as in Figure 1, may hâve an assistant as well. The branch 
manager is responsible for the overall opérations of the branch but his chief 
concern lies with the financial viability of the branch. Day-to-day opéra-
tions of the branch are left to the accountant. In effect an office manager, 
"the branch accountant plans, organizes and directs the routine activities of 
the branch and supervises ail personnel below the rank of accountant"13. 
Generalizations about the degree of actual décision making power exer-
cised by branch management with respect to personnel practices must be 
made cautiously. In theory, the wages, hours and working conditions of 
most branch employées are established on national or régional bases by 
each bank. Recruitment, especially in urban centers, often is handled by 
central recruiting offices which screen and place employées into branches as 
need dictâtes. Most personnel forms (applications, performance appraisals) 
are standardized throughout a given bank. In matters relating to discipline, 
promotion and transfer, branch management usually only has the power to 
recommend, it is the national or régional office that makes the final 
décision14. 
Yet, set against thèse centralizing tendencies are a number of decen-
tralizing ones. Recommendations initiated at the branch level involving hir-
ing, assessment, promotion, discipline and termination are only infrequent-
ly not implemented15. Furthermore, a variety of informai arrangements ap-
pear to hâve arisen which enhance local discrétion. One accountant des-
cribed how after becoming friendly with the staff at the bank's urban 
recruitment center, he was usually able to obtain the spécifie person he 
12 The organization chart which appears as Figure 1 was présentée! as an exhibit by a ma-
jor bank during a Canada Labour Relations Board hearing. 
n BOSSEN, "Manpower Utilization in Canadian Chartered Banks", p. 10. 
14 The preceding discussion was based on: CLRB Décision++90, June 10, 1977, 
SORWUC and CIBC; Canada Labour Relations Board, Décision 91, June 10, 1977, Cana-
dian Union of Bank Employées and Bank of Nova Scotia; Canada Labour Relations Board, 
Transcripts of Proceedings, SORWUC and CIBC, April 18 to April 22, 1977, Vancouver, 
B.C.; BOSSEN, "Manpower Utilization in Canadian Chartered Banks". 
15 Testimony of Mr. E.S. DUFFIELD, Senior vice-président of Human Resources and 
Administration, CIBC before CLRB, CLRB, Transcripts of Proceedings, SORWUC and 
CIBC, p. 166. 
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wanted to fill branch vacancies. During another interview, a former assis-
tant manager explained that rather than recommending an especially able 
employée for promotion, branch management might attempt to reward 
such an individual in other ways since promoted employées typically were 
transferred. Thèse "other ways" could involve merit increases, spécial 
scheduling arrangements or manipulation of the job classification System. 
Thèse examples, though based on only a small number of interviews, sug-
gest that in practice, branch management may hâve greater scope in person-
nel matters than appears to be the case on paper. Thèse illustrations also 
suggest that because branch management discrétion in personnel matters 
partially rests on the success of informai arrangements, much variation 
could be expected from branch to branch. 
It is not yet clear how the labour relations function will develop within 
the current management structure nor what effect unionization will hâve in 
some of the informai personnel arrangements which hâve evolved. Thus 
far, managers of unionized branches usually hâve attended negotiating ses-
sions, but in an ancillary rôle. Depending on the bank involved, negotia-
tions are headed by head office or régional staff, outside industrial relations 
consultants, or labour lawyers. Although collective agreements designate 
branch management as the employer's représentative in the first two steps 
of the grievance process, it remains to be seen how much actual grievance 
authority branch accountants and managers will possess in practice. Gener-
ally, a collective bargaining relationship places a high premium on consis-
tency, suggesting that the informai decentralizing tendencies évident with 
respect to personnel practices are less likely to émerge in the labour relations 
function. Furthermore, it might be hypothesized that informai personnel 
arrangements will be curtailed in matters that conceivably are bargainable. 
Non-Managerial Staff 
As can be seen from Figure 1, non-managerial branch staff perform a 
variety of functions under numerous job titles. Broadly defined however, 
the majority are engaged either as tellers, in fairly routine clérical tasks, or 
in secretarial capacities. An investigation of employée distribution at three 
major banks found that tellers (25%), clerks (25%) and individuals pro-
viding secretarial and typing services (10%) accounted for sixty percent of 
ail employées across the System16. Further analysis showed that virtually ail 
(97%) of the employées in thèse positions were women. By contrast, less 
16 BOSSEN, Employment in Chartered Banks, p. 26. 
17 Ibid., p. 26. 
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than half of the branch accountants in the three banks and only four per-
cent of the branch managers were women17. It was found overall that forty 
percent of maie bank employées were in positions of management in 1975, 
but less than five percent of female employées were so classified18. Thus, 
while female bank employées outnumber their maie counterparts by a three 
to one ratio19, women are substantially under-represented in management 
and over-represented at lower levels. Salary levels reflect thèse employment 
patterns: in 1975, three quarters of female bank employées earned less than 
$8,000 annually compared to only ten percent of the men20. Investigations 
hâve also revealed that turnover among non-managerial branch personnel is 
substantial (35% annually)21, the majority of staff hâve no more than a high 
school éducation22, approximately twenty percent work on a part-time 
basis23, and among full-time women workers close to forty-five percent are 
single versus twenty-five percent of the men24. 
THE BARGAINING UNIT QUESTION 
The decentralized physical structure and highly centralized operating 
procédures characteristic of Canadian banks has produced a high degree of 
organizational complexity and differentiation25; as a resuit, the bargaining 
unit question has been unusually controversial and problematical. Em-
ployées of federally chartered banks are governed by the Canada Labour 
Code and under this statute it is the responsibility of the Canada Labour 
Relations Board to delineate appropriate bargaining unit dimensions in any 
given situation. Uncertainty prior to 1977 with respect to the Board*s posi-
tion has been offered as a major reason for the non-union status of bank 
employées until then. 
18 Ibid., p . 25 . The propor t ion of women in management represents an improvement 
from 1968 when Bossen found that only 1.7% of women b a n k employées were in manager ia l 
posi t ions. 
19 Canad ian Bankers ' Associat ion, Factbook, p . 6. It is interesting to note tha t the gap 
has been widening. In 1967 the rat io in favour of women was less than two to one . 
20 BOSSEN, Employment in Chartered Banks, p. 22. 
21 CLRB D e c i s i o n # 9 1 , June 10,1977, C U B E and Bank of Nova Scotia; Canada Labour 
Relations Board, Dec i s ion# l 11, November 3 , 1977. Service, Office and Retail Worker s Un ion 
of C a n a d a and The Royal Bank of C a n a d a . 
22 BOSSEN, Employment in Chartered Banks, p . 31. 
23 Ibid., p . 7; 11. 
24 Ibid., p . 10. 
25 L A W R E N C E , P . R . , and J . L O R S C H , Organization and Environment, Cambr idge , 
Mass . , Harvard University, 1967. 
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The uncertainty was rooted in a 1959 CLRB décision involving a 
Kitimat, British Columbia branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia and The 
Kitimat, Terrace and District General Worker's Union, a directly chartered 
local of the CLC. The union applied to the Board to be certified as bargain-
ing agent for tellers, clerks, ledgerkeepers and stenographers at the single 
Bank of Nova Scotia branch in Kitimat. At the time the application was 
made, the proposed bargaining unit comprised a total of three persons. The 
Board rejected the union's application, arguing that such a small, isolated 
unit would be unlikely to hâve a real prospect of functioning effectively. 
However, the Board then attempted to limit the wider ramifications of 
its décision. It explicitly stated that its ruling did not constitute agreement 
with the bank's contention that the only appropriate unit was one that in-
cluded ail its non-managerial personnel in Canada, declared that its décision 
had been reached only on the basis of the particular facts of the Kitimat 
situation, and suggested that "it may well be that units of some of the em-
ployées of a Bank, grouped together territorially or on some other basis, 
will prove to be appropriate, rather than a nation-wide unit"26. Thèse qua-
lifying statements notwithstanding, the apparent rejection by the Board of 
the single branch bargaining concept coupled with the absence of a défini-
tive alternative significantly reduced the likelihood of bank unionism. High 
turnover rates, scattered locations, and uncertainty whether any unit short 
of a nation-wide one would prove acceptable discouraged interested unions. 
More importantly, the Kitimat décision may hâve created confusion among 
bank employées themselves as to their rights vis a vis unionization. The 
président of the Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Canada 
(SORWUC), testifying before the CLRB in 1977, elaborated this proposi-
tion as follows: 
I hâve been involved in actually approaching bank employées and trying 
to convince them to join the union... Probably the most important pro-
blem we deal with is that many bank employées respond to us by saying... 
yes, a union for bank employées is a good idea... yes, we should be entitl-
ed to union protection and collective bargaining rights like other em-
ployées but we don't believe that it is possible. They say things like... the 
Government would never allow it, a union in the banks... the Bank Act 
would hâve to be changed in order to allow bank employées to unionize. 
In gênerai... most bank employées are not really aware that they hâve the 
légal right to organize into unions27. 
26 Canada Labour Relations Board, September 11, 1959. Kitimat, Terrace and District 
General Workers Union, Local 1583, Canadian Labour Congress and The Bank of Nova 
Scotia. 
27 Testimony of Ms. Jean RANDS, Président of SORWUC before CLRB, Transcripts 
of Proceedings, SORWUC and CIBC, pp. 55-56. 
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If the bank's ability to remain non-union was facilitated by the 1959 
CLRB décision, there can be little question that the reversai of this décision 
in 1977 dramatically enhanced union prospects. In August 1976 two unions, 
apparently independently of each other, filed applications with the CLRB 
for certification at several branches of the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Bank 
of Montréal, and the Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)28. The 
CLRB conducted hearings in the spring, 1977, and in a séries of précèdent 
setting décisions ruled that a single branch of thèse banks did constitute an 
appropriate unit for bargaining. The key décision in this regard involved 
SORWUC and the Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce29. In that déci-
sion, and later ones, the Board not only accepted that a single branch was 
an appropriate unit for bargaining, but explicitly rejected the appropriate-
ness of nationwide or province-wide bargaining units30. 
In the SORWUC — CIBC décision, the Board elaborated in some 
détail why it considered a single branch an appropriate unit. First, it was 
proposed that "employées consider the single location unit a natural unit, 
because this is where the employées work". Second, the Board argued that 
"the common practice of labour relations boards (is) to hold that the single 
location is an appropriate bargaining unit" reflecting a consensus among 
boards that strong communities of interest exist at single locations. 
Natural inclinations of employées and common practice of labour rela-
tions board aside, however, the foremost basis for the Board*s décision lay 
in its interprétation of its responsibilities under the Canada Labour Code. 
The Board stated: 
The express intention of Parliament is the "encouragement of free collec-
tive bargaining"... This législative intent cas best be achieved by facili-
tating collective bargaining for employées who choose this procédure for 
settling their terms and conditions of employment. That can be accom-
plished by this Board accepting or fashioning bargaining units that give 
employées their rights under the Code. Too large units in unorganized in-
dustries will abort any real possibility of collective bargaining ever com-
mencing and defeat this express intention of Parliament31. (emphasis 
added) 
28 According to the records of the Canada Labour Relations Board, SORWUC filed ap-
plications for certification at branches of the Bank of Montréal and Canadian Impérial Bank 
of Commerce on August 25, 1976 and August 16, 1976, respectively. CUBE filed its first ap-
plication for a branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia on June 28, 1977. 
29 CLRB Decision#90, June 10, 1977, SORWUC and CIBC. 
30 CLRB Decis ion#l 11, November 3, 1977, SORWUC and The Royal Bank of Canada . 
31 CLRB Décision**90, June 10, 1977, SORWUC and CIBC. 
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To back up its reasoning the Board cited the effect of its 1959 Bank of 
Nova Scotia décision in Kitimat, offering it as a "real life example of abor-
ting the possibility of collective bargaining". The Board further posited that 
"the history of union activity is that unions begin or are based in a par-
ticular locale". 
The considérations were sufficient, in the Board's opinion, to outweigh 
the employer's arguments that administrative convenience, the desirability 
of system wide common terms of employment, and the potential confusion 
stemming from a prolifération of bargaining units demanded a nation-wide 
unit of ail non-managerial CIBC employées. Thèse same considérations 
were also sufficient several months later to outweigh the Royal Bank of 
Canada's request for a province-wide bargaining unit. While recognizing 
that a provincial unit would be relatively easier to organize than a national 
one, the Board still believed that the task was an unrealistically difficult 
one: "to require employées in two hundred and three locations to act in 
concert would... effectively negate any realistic possibility of exercising the 
freedom granted in Section 110(1)" of the Canada Labour Code (freedom 
to join a trade union and participate in its lawful activities)32. 
If the bargaining unit's external boundaries were of paramount con-
cern, determining its internai dimensions also was important. Addressing 
this issue in a séries of décisions, the CLRB established a number of pat-
terns33. The major démarcation line in the branch between those employées 
to be included in the bargaining unit and those to be excluded was drawn 
between the positions of accountant and assistant account. Most employées 
at or above the accountant level were deemed by reason of their supervisory 
authority and through application of the "community of interest" test to be 
outside the bargaining unit. This included branch managers, assistant man-
agers, branch administrative officers, administrative managers and accoun-
tants. Below the level of accountant, clérical staff (e.g. ledgerkeepers, sav-
ings clerks), tellers and assistant accountants were placed into the bargain-
ing unit with little discussion from the Board and little disagreernent from 
the parties. 
32 CLRB Décision#111, November 3, 1977, SORWUC and The Royal Bank of Canada. 
33 See Canada Labour Relations Board, Décision 92, June 10, 1977, Canadian Union 
of Bank Employées and Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce; Canada Labour Relations 
Board, Décision ** 104, September 6, 1977, Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of 
Canada and Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce; Canada Labour Relations Board, Déci-
sion 105, September 7, 1977, Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Canada and Bank 
of Montréal; Canada Labour Relations Board, Décision 106, September 7, 1977, Service, Of-
fice and Retail Workers Union of Canada and Toronto-Dominion Bank; CLRB, Décision 
111, November 3, 1977, SORWUC and Royal Bank of Canada; Canada Labour Relations 
Board, Décision^ 27, March 14, 1978, Retail Clerks International Union and Bank Canadian 
National. 
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Some debate was generated with respect to employées involved in crédit 
and loan positions, performing secretarial duties, participating in training 
programs, and those working on a part-time basis. In the case of employées 
in crédit and loan functions, the Board decided that, senior loans officers 
and account managers excepted, thèse employées should be in the bargain-
ing unit. This détermination was made despite the fact that in some in-
stances, such as crédit officers in the Bank of Montréal, normal career pro-
gression would take an employée out of the bargaining unit (accountant), 
into the bargaining unit (crédit officer), and back out again (branch man-
ager) within a two to three year period. The Board admitted that the crédit 
officer's "inclusion gives him an anomalous character,, but justified its 
décision in part on its belief that "in many industries senior management 
has benefited greatly from past bargaining unit and trade union expérience 
its members hâve had"34. 
The Board also determined that secretarial staff including stenogra-
phers, typists, dicta-typists and the manager's secretary in most cases were 
not sufficiently involved in confidential industrial relations activities to war-
rant their exclusion from the bargaining unit35. With regard to management 
trainees, the Board decided to exclude only those trainees whose community 
of interest it was felt clearly lay with management, who where training for 
positions outside the bargaining unit and whose training period usually was 
of relatively short duration (9-12 months)36. Finally, keeping with gênerai 
practice, casual part-time employées were excluded from the bargaining 
unit while regular part-time employées were included37. 
In summary, the overall effect of the bargaining unit décisions involv-
ing the banks would appear to facilitate union organizing. The désignation 
of single branches as appropriate for collective bargaining clearly has served 
as a major impetus to serious organizing efforts by making it possible for a 
union to mount an organization drive without initially having to possess 
and commit massive resources. The impact of the Board's décisions regar-
ding the perimeters within the branch is less clearcut. 
34 CLRB D é c i s i o n " 105, September 7, 1977, S O R W U C and Bank of Montréa l . 
35 CLRB Decisionttl27, Mardi 14, 1978, RCIU and Bank Canadian National. 
36 CLRB Decision#104, September 6, 1977, SORWUC and CIBC; CLRB Décision 
105, September 7, 1977, SORWUC and Bank of Montréal. 
37 CLRB Decisiontt92, June 10, 1977, CUBE and CIBC; CLRB Décision 104, Sep-
tember 6, 1977, SORWUC and CIBC. 
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Initial opposition to including assistant accountants and crédit and 
loan officers in the unit came from unions38, suggesting fear that such indi-
viduals would be less favorable to unionism than tellers and clérical staff. 
Indeed, in one instance that has been documented, a loan officer success-
fully convinced fellow employées to oppose organization in a branch of the 
Bank of Nova Scotia39. (The union appealed to the CLRB claiming that the 
loan officer was acting on behalf of management, a contention rejected by 
the Board.) It seems plausible to assume that "career track" employées 
such as loan officers will prove less union prone. Thus, the Board's practice 
of placing a wide array of branch employées in the same unit could prove an 
organizing impediment that balances to some extent the ameliorative aspect 
(from the union's perspective) of the single branch bargaining concept. 
The single branch concept also will exercise an impact on collective 
bargaining structure. With thousands of branches ail over the country, a 
dozen différent banks and many competing unions, the structural permu-
tations and combinations seem infinité. Assuming bank employées do opt 
for unionism in large numbers, will central or régional bargaining tables 
émerge; will individual banks join forces; will unions try to coordinate their 
actions, and if so, how; or will fragmentation and whipsawing become the 
norm40? 
The banks insisted at the outset on a bargaining structure which would 
mirror organizing structure, that is branch by branch bargaining41. The 
unions, on the other hand, favored more centralized approaches42. The 
director of the CLC's Bank Workers' Organizing Committee described the 
single-unit décision as a double-edged sword which, while making it easier 
for unions to organize, at the same time established units possessing little 
clout at the bargaining table. She believed that unions had to "manufac-
ture" bargaining power by organizing and insisting on bargaining on behalf 
of a sufficiently large number of branches in a géographie région to make 
the threat of a work stoppage viable43. 
38 CLRB Decis ion#92, June 10, 1977, CUBE and CIBC. 
39 Canada Labour Relations Board, Déc i s ion"123 , February 6, 1978, Retail Clerks In-
ternational Union and the Bank of Nova Scotia. 
40 See Arnold Weber (éd.), The Structure of Collective Bargaining, New York, The Free 
Press, 1961. 
41 " L a b o u r Unions and Chartered Banks — An U p d a t e " , Investment Notes, Burns Fry 
Limited, February 1978. 
42 " B a n k Union Will Seek Master Contract Covering Branches" , Toronto Globe and 
Mail, July 26, 1977: " U n i o n Tactics Backfire in Bank Contracts Ba t t l e" , Vancouver Province, 
November 14, 1977. 
43 Interview held with Lorraine S INGLER, Director of Bank Workers ' Organizing 
Commit tee (CLC), July 24, 1978, Vancouver. 
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The banks, too, may well find branch by branch bargaining to be very 
expensive, time-consuming and difficult to coordinate. If the contract 
periods become scattered throughout the year, then bargaining may become 
a chaotic, never-ending process in which it would be impossible to déter-
mine o ver ail impacts in any meaningful way. 
Any of several alternative bargaining structures may be superior to 
branch by branch bargaining, ranging from metropolitan area bargaining 
through régional to some national structure. For example, the banking 
System in England, portions of which hâve been unionized since 1918, has 
evolved a System of national bargaining based on a formalized joint nego-
tiation agreement. On "domestic" issues (those affecting ail banks), the 
major bank trade union, the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union, (for-
merly the National Union of Bank Employées) negotiates with the Fédéra-
tion of London Clearing Banks, raising demands which hâve been previous-
ly ratified by bank staff associations and any other unions covered by pre-
vious agreements. On any issues unique to individual banks, such as loca-
tion differentials and allowances, the major union negotiates with that bank 
directly through a formalized arrangement. This System seems to hâve been 
somewhat successful. Although provision for arbitration exists as a final 
stage settlement device, it has only been employed two times in the past 10 
years, and for rather minor issues44. 
EARLY ORGANIZING PATTERNS 
Tables 1-5 highlight the extent and pattern of organizing activity in the 
three-year period after the first applications for certification were received 
by the Canada Labour Relations Board. In gênerai, the data show that only 
at a very small proportion of branches (less than 2%) was the activity suffi-
cient to produce a union application. 
An overview of the situation is presented in Table 1, a time perspective 
is provided in Table 2, and a géographie distribution is reported in Table 3. 
Of the 138 applications made, a substantial majority resulted in certifica-
tion. While organizing activity slackened after the first half of 1978, later 
applications were more likely to resuit in certifications than applications fil-
ed earlier in the period under scrutiny. Furthermore, most certifications 
hâve been automatic; if a représentation vote was necessary (i.e. union 
could not show more than 65 percent support) the union's application 
usually did not succeed. Most organizing activity has been confined to 
British Columbia, Ontario and Québec; however, at least one application 
has been filed in every province but Alberta and Prince Edward Island. 
44 The foregoing discussion is based on interviews and research conducted in Britain by 
one of the authors in 1979. 
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Activity 
Applications 
Certifications 
a) Automatic 
b) Vote 
Rejections 
a) Automatic 
b) Vote 
Withdrawals 
Pending 
Decertifications 
TABLE 1 
Organizing Totals in Canadian Banking (6/76 — 1/80) 
Number 
138 
102 
95 
7 
29 
2 
27 
6 
1 
29 
A verage Size 
of Unit 
18.5 
17.8 
17.9 
14.1 
20.3 
16 
20.6 
12.5 
2.8 
14.0 
Source: Records of the Canada Labour Relations Board 
TABLE 2 
Time Perspective on Organizing Activity in Canadian Banking 
Time Period Applications Certifications Reject/ Pending Decertifications0 
1976 (7-12) 
1977 (1- 6) 
1977 (7-12) 
1978 (1- 6) 
1978 (7-12) 
1979 (1- 6) 
1979 (7-12) 
22 
5 
36 
32 
17 
16 
10 
Withdrawals 
12 10 0 
0 5 0 
23 13 0 
26 6 0 
17 0 0 
16 0 0 
8 1 1 
a
 Decertifications listed to reflect period in which application for certification of decertified 
branch first made. 
Source: Records of the Canada Labour Relations Board 
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TABLE 3 
Organizing of Canadian Banks, by Province (6/76 — 1/80) 
Province Applications Certifications Reject/ Pending Decertifications 
Withdrawals 
BC 51 32 19 
ALTA — — — 
SASK 4 3 1 
MAN 3 1 2 
ONT 38 27 10 
QUE 33 31 2 
NS 5 5 — 
NB 3 3 — 
PEI — — — 
NFLD 1 — 1 
Source: Records of the Canada Labour Relations Board 
It can also be seen that branches in which applications were successful 
were smaller on average than branches in which applications did non suc-
ceed. Although the size differential is not great (20.3 vs 17.8) this prelimi-
nary trend is consistent with a récent study by Graham Lowe45. Based on in-
terviews with employées at three branches where union applications had 
been filed, Lowe posited that the greater social cohesiveness among em-
ployées in smaller branches would increase the chances of a union applica-
tion succeeding46. 
The data also reveal that of the 102 branches that were certified, 29 
later were decertified. Twenty-six of the decertifications involved a single 
union, SORWUC, occurred approximately at the same time (August 1978), 
and were not indicative of a gênerai pattern. The union itself applied to the 
CLRB to hâve the branches decertified, citing financial problems, lack of 
support from other unions, and the frustration of eight months of fruitless 
negotiations with the banks47. SORWUC is a small (less than 1 000 workers) 
independent British Columbia based union with a strong feminist orienta-
tion. Its expérience to a large extent reflects spécial circumstances not 
shared by the other unions currently involved in bank organizing. 
45 L O W E , Graham, " T h e Canadian Union of Bank Employées: A Case S t u d y " , Work-
ing Paper 7805, Centre for Industrial Relations, University of To ron to , August 1978. 
46 It is noteworthy that our findings, and Lowe's prédictions, contradict George Bain 's 
model of white-collar union growth. Bain suggests that worksite size is positively associated 
with union growth. George S. BAIN, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1970. 
47 Vancouver Sun, August 1, 1978; The Bank Book Collective, An Account to Settle. 
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The expérience of the other unions, as well as SORWUC, is reported in 
Table 4. With certifications permitted on a branch-by-branch basis, eight 
différent unions filed at least one application for certification. There are 
several factors that should limit the prolifération of bargaining agents. 
First, in the Fall 1977, the CLC established the Bank Workers Organizing 
Committee (BWOC)48. It was intended that BWOC would coordinate 
organizing activity among CLC affiliâtes and that thèse affiliâtes eventually 
would turn back workers over to BWOC to permit the formation of a na-
tional bankworkers union. 
TABLE 4 
Organizing of Canadian Banks, by Union (6/76 — 1/80) 
Union Applications Certifications Reject/ Pending 
Withdrawals 
Decertifications 
SORWUC 45 26 19 — 26 
RCIU 37 26 11 — 2 
CSN 13 13 — — — 
OPEIU 4 3 1 — — 
CUBE 4 3 1 — — 
UBE 30 28 1 1 1 
USWA 4 3 1 — — 
ACTE 1 0 1 — — 
SORWUC — Service, Office, Retail Workers' Union of Canada (INDEPENDENT) 
RCIU — Retail Clerks' International Union (CLC/AFL-CIO) 
CSN — Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux 
OPEIU — Office and Professional Employées International Union (CLC/AFL-CIO) 
CUBE — Canadian Union of Bank Employées (CLC) 
UBE — Union of Bank Employées (CLC) 
USWA — United Steel Workers of America (CLC/AFL-CIO) 
ACTE — Association of Commercial and Technical Employées (CLC) 
Source: Canada Labour Relations Board Records 
Either working closely with BWOC or falling directly under BWOC s 
control are four of the unions listed in Table 4: CUBE, UBE, ACTE and 
the Steelworkers. A second constraint on the prolifération of bargaining 
agents is the high probability that the Confédération des Syndicats Natio-
naux (CSN) will choose not to expand its activity beyond the province of 
Québec. Third, although représentatives of the SORWUC insist that the 
union will re-enter the bank organizing field, it is questionable whether they 
possess the necessary resources. 
48 The foregoing discussion of the CLC's Bank Workers' Organizing Committee is 
based in large part on interviews held with its director. 
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Both the Retail Clerks International Union and the Office and Profes-
sional Employées International Union promise to exert significant in-
fluence. Both unions claim jurisdication over bank employées and hâve 
organized bank workers in United States. The OPEIU has represented 
employées of the City and District Savings Bank since 1967 and also has 
been active among crédit union employées. After SORWUC, the Retail 
Clerks filed the most applications in the period examined. It is not surpris-
ing that the OPEIU and Retail Clerks, though CLC affiliâtes, hâve yet to 
express a willingness to eventually turn over bank employées to BWOC49. 
Thus, the early expérience suggests that four major union organizing 
centers will émerge: the unions operating under the BWOC umbrella; the 
OPEIU; the Retail Clerks; and in Québec, the CSN. It should be noted, 
however, that ample opportunity still exists for other unions, such as the 
Teamsters or the Service Employées International Union, to undertake ma-
jor efforts among bank workers. 
Organizing expérience within the individual chartered banks is sum-
marized in Table 5. More than half of ail applications and half of the total 
number of certifications were accounted for by the Bank of Montréal and 
Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce. The Bank of Montréal was addi-
tionally faced with the prospect of dealing with seven différent bargaining 
agents. However, thèse two banks were most directly affected by the 
SORWUC decertifications; both organizations saw almost half of their 
unionized branches decertified. Employées of the CIBC also proved to be 
the least likely to actually certify once an application for certification had 
been filed; approximately half of the CIBC applications were either re-
jected or withdrawn. In fact, the CIBC was the only bank in which a ma-
jority of applications did not lead to actual certifications. On the other 
hand, the Royal Bank of Canada and the Banque Canadienne Nationale 
saw 93 percent and 100 percent of union applications resuit in certifications, 
respectively. 
It is by no means clear that the patterns evidenced in the preceeding 
tables will hold up over time. The early expérience has shown that: 1) organ-
izing is proceeding slowly, there has been no "take off" and no indication 
that one is about to occur; 2) the ratio of certifications to applications has 
been increasing over time, the unions are definitely winning more often than 
they are losing; 3) organizing activity is heavily concentrated in British 
Columbia, Ontario and Québec which account for about 90 percent of ap-
plications; 4) ail of the major banks hâve been involved, with the Bank of 
Montréal and CIBC having seen the most applications; and 5) serious union 
involvement has been narrowed to four major organizations, the Retail 
Clerks, OPEIU, the CLC's Bank Workers Organizing Committee, and in 
Québec the CSN. 
49 Ibid. 
TABLE 5 
Organizing in Canadian Banking, by Bank (6/76 — 1/80) 
Bank Applications 
Unions 
Certifications 
Auto Vote Total 
Rejections 
Auto Vote Total 
Withdrawals Pend 
Bank of Montréal 46 7 33 3 36 1 9 10 0 0 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 15 3 14 0 14 0 0 0 ! 0 
Canadian Impérial 
Bank of Commerce 30 4 14 1 15 1 11 12 2 1 
Bank of 
Nova Scotia 19 5 8 3 11 0 6 6 2 0 
Toronto-Dominion 
Bank 6 4 4 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 
Banque Canadienne 
Nationale 16 3 15 1 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Prov. Bank of 
Canada 4 2 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank of 
British Columbia 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Banque Nationale 
du Canada • 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Records of the Canada Labour Relations Board 
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COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS 
To investigate the emerging "web of rules" in unionized branches, an 
analysis of recently negotiated contracts was undertaken follôwing a pro-
cédure used by Kochan and Wheeler and others50. Twelve agreements de-
signed to provide a représentative cross-section were selected51. Six différent 
banks and five unions were represented in the sample; nine of the agree-
ments were first contracts, three were second agreements. The analysis 
focused on clauses most likely to influence operating procédures and work-
ing conditions. Régional disparities, difficulties in classifying positions 
across institutions, and slightly différent contract periods resulted in the ex-
clusion of wage items. 
To provide additional perspective, fifteen collective agreements cover-
ing Canadian crédit unions52, twelve contracts governing bank and trust 
50 K O C H A N , T h o m a s , and H o y t W H E E L E R , "Munic ipa l Collective Bargaining: A 
Model and Analysis of Bargaining O u t c o m e s " , Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol . 
29,1*1, October 1975, p p . 46-66; J o h n A N D E R S E N , "Barga in ing Outcomes : A n IR System 
A p p r o a c h " , Industrial Relations, Vol. 1 8 , # 2 , Spring 1979, p p . 127-143. 
51 The foliowing twelve agreements were analyzed; commencement and expiry dates a re 
listed in parenthèses: The Bank of Nova Scotia, Po r t Dover , On ta r io — Canad ian Union of 
Bank Employées (November 1978 — December 1979); Bank of Mont réa l , Tweed, Onta r io — 
Retail Clerks Internat ional Union (April 1979 — December 1980); T o r o n t o Domin ion Bank , 
Saskatoon — United Steelworkers of America ( January 1979 — December 1979); Bank of 
Mont réa l , Windsor — Union of Bank Employées (February 1979 — February 1980); Banque 
Canadienne Nat ionale , Montréa l — Retail Clerks In ternat ional Un ion (May 1979 — Apri l 
1981); Bank of Mont réa l , Agassiz, B .C . — Office and Professional Employées Internat ional 
Union (April 1979 — March 1981); Canad ian Impérial Bank of Commerce , Winnipeg — Retail 
Clerks Internat ional Union ( January 1979 — December 1979); Banque Canadienne Nat ionale , 
Aima, Québec — Confédérat ion des Syndicats Na t ionaux (May 1979 — Apri l 1980); Bank of 
Nova Scotia, Por t H a r d y , B .C . — Office and Professional Employées Union ( January 1979 — 
December 1979); Bank of Nova Scotia, Rothsay, N . B . — Union of Bank Employées ( January 
1980 — December 1980); Royal Bank of C a n a d a , P ic tou , N . S . — Union of Bank Employées 
( January 1979 — December 1980) and , Canad ian Impérial Bank of Commerce , St. Catherines 
— Union of Bank Employées (March 1979 — March 1980). 
52 The follôwing crédit agreements were analyzed, commencement and expiry dates 
listed in parenthesis : Master Office Agreement , O P E I U : Alberni District Crédi t Un ion — 
O P E I U (July 1977 — July 1978); N a n a i m o District Savings Crédi t Un ion — O P E I U (July 1977 
— July 1979); I W A Crédit Un ion — O P E I U (April 1977 — Apri l 1978); Ladysmi th and 
District Crédit Union — O P E I U (July 1977 — July 1979); Uni ted States Crédit Un ion — 
O P E I U ( January 1978 — December 1978); Kimberley Crédit Un ion — O P E I U ( January 1978 
— December 1979); Squamish Crédit Union — O P E I U (July 1977 — July 1979); Vancouver 
City Savings Crédit Un ion — O P E I U (July 1977 — July 1978); VanTel Crédi t Un ion — 
O P E I U (January 1978 — December 1978); Transpor t Crédit Un ion of B .C . — O P E I U (Jan-
uary 1976 — December 1978); C U & C Heal th Service Society — O P E I U (October 1977 — Oc-
tober 1979); Lake Cowichan and District Crédit Un ion — O P E I U (July 1977 — July 1979); 
Au to Workers Crédi t Un ion Limited — O P E I U (February 1976 — February 1978); Castelgar 
Savings Crédit Union — Internat ional Woodworke r s of America (March 1976 — March 1978). 
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companies in United States53, and the agreement between the Montréal City 
and District Savings Bank and the OPEIU also were examined54. In com-
parison to the Canadian chartered banks contracts, this latter set of agree-
ments generally reflects older, mère established relationships and thus 
may be indicative of future directions within the Canadian chartered bank 
sector55. 
The results of the entire analysis are reported in an appendix available 
from the authors upon request. It should be noted that in the discussion that 
follows, use of the term contracts/collective agreements refers to the sample 
of the twelve collective agreements from Canadian chartered banks. Where 
référence is made to the contracts in the U.S. financial institutions, the 
crédit union, and the Montréal City and District Saving Bank, those con-
tracts will be identified specifically. 
Union Security and Rights 
The majority of Canadian bank agreements contained Rand Formulae. 
In only two cases was a modified union shop included. Furthermore, in 
several agreements, a * 'modified" Rand Formula might hâve been a more 
appropriate description of the union security provision as only employées 
hired after the date of certification were required to pay union dues. Most 
53 The U . S . collective agreements a re listed as follows with the c o m m e n c e m e n t a n d ter-
mination date in parenthèses: The National Bank of Washington, D.C. — OPEIU (April 1976 
— April 1978); Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago — Chicago Joint Board, 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (September 1976 — September 1979); 
United States National Bank in Johnstown — United Steelworkers of America (November 
1976 — October 1979); United Penn Bank of Wilkes-Barre — United Steelworkers of America 
(August 1978 — August 1979); First Wisconsin National Bank — First Wisconsin National 
Bank Employées Association (September 1977 — September 1980); Landmark Northwest 
Plaza Bank — OPEIU (January 1977 — January 1980); Ludlow Savings Bank — RCIU 
(August 1976 — August 1979); Otoe County National Bank — Communications Workers of 
America (December 1978 — January 1979); State Bank of India (Chicago) — Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union (October 1977 — October 1980); Amalgamated Bank of 
New York — OPEIU (July 1977 — July 1980); The Trust Company of New Jersey — OPEIU 
(June 1976 — June 1978); Superior National Bank and Trust Company — RCIU (November 
1975 — November 1978). 
54 The Montréal City and District Savings Bank — O P E I U collective agreement covered 
the period January 1978 to December 1979. 
55 Due to the difficulty of compiling a complète list of unionized financial institutions in 
North America, it is not possible to détermine the representativeness of the sample of contracts 
examined. With respect to the U.S. agreements, eight of thirty-two contracts listed in Charles 
COLEMAN and Jane ROSE, "Bank Unionization: Status and Prospects", Monthly Labor 
Review, October 1975, 38-41, were obtained. As well, major unions and the U.S. Department 
of Labor were contacted. With respect to the Canadian sample of crédit unions, however, 
British Columbia is substantially over-represented. 
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contracts provided some paid time off for union activity, but limited this 
paid time off to grievance discussions between stewards and branch man-
agement outside of bank operating hours. With only two exceptions, paid 
time off was not extended to negotiations. Ail contracts were silent on the 
issue of the right of employées to refuse to cross a picket line without being 
subject to discipline. 
The U.S. and crédit union contracts, in comparison, almost ail includ-
ed provision for a union shop. Crédit union agreements also generally per-
mitted employées to refuse to cross picket lines without being liable to 
discipline. 
Hours of Work 
Ail twelve contracts provided a 37-1/2 hour work week. This fell be-
tween 40 hour week which was the norm in almost half of the U.S. contracts 
and the 35 hour week which most crédit union agreements specified. Vir-
tually ail Canadian bank contracts also required 3 years service for 3 weeks 
of vacation. Several of the contracts contained an interesting arrangement, 
however, whereby an employée with only one year of service could take a 
three week vacation if the vacation was taken during winter. None of the 
contracts provided for non-conventional scheduling arrangements (e.g. 
flex-time). 
Employées received time and a half for overtime work and one agree-
ment provided double time for work on Sunday. Generally, management 
retained substantial discrétion with respect to the allocation of overtime. 
Contracts either contained no provision on this matter, made overtime 
mandatory for the designated employée, or rather vaguely specified that 
overtime be deferred "having due regard for employée personal needs". In 
contrast, most crédit union agreements enabled employées to refuse over-
time. 
Promotion, Layoff, Transfer 
One usual conséquence of unionization is change in the way an organi-
zation advertises and fills positions in the bargaining unit. Job posting and 
bidding Systems frequently are introduced and greater emphasis placed on 
seniority in personnel décisions. The beginning of such practices were évi-
dent in the Canadian bank contracts examined, but it was clear that such 
provisions were very rudimentary from the union's perspective. Criteria for 
layoff and promotion were specified in virtually ail cases with seniority of 
primary importance in the layoff décision. But much less weight was attach-
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ed to seniority in promotion décisions with multiple factors such as "perfor-
mance, skills, ability, and other qualifications" typically taking precedence. 
Thus, management was assured substantial control. There were no job 
posting or bidding Systems in the majority of contracts and where included 
they were not too well defined. Even requirements that current employées 
be given préférence with respect to vacancies were vaguely worded. 
In comparison, similar contract clauses in the U.S. banks, crédit union 
agreements, and the City and District were much more elaborate, were bet-
ter defined, and placed relatively more weight on seniority. The detailed 
provisions found in the City and District-OPEIU agreement are a good il-
lustration. Promotions, demotions, layoffs and transfers were explicitly 
defined. Distinctions were drawn between permanent and temporary posi-
tions and between transfers within a job grade and transfers to another 
branch. It was required that ail permanent vacancies had to be posted for 
five working days and that the most senior applicant capable of doing the 
job receive the position. In the event the most senior employée was turned 
down, the employer was required to give reasons in writing. Layoffs, and 
recall from layoffs were based entirely on seniority and three months ad-
vance notice was necessary in the case of a permanent layoff. Counterbalan-
cing thèse provisions from management's point of view, however, were 
clauses which: 1) exempted the bank from posting positions in the lowest 
classification (junior tellers, photocopiers), 2) required that employées ac-
cumulate nine months' seniority before bidding on a transfer, 3) required 
that employées register with the bank's central personnel office to be eli-
gible for a transfer, and 4) required an employée who had successfully bid 
on a position to remain in the new position for at least 12 months. 
Job protection 
Job protection clauses were not major components of the twelve Cana-
dian bank contracts surveyed. With respect to technological change, provi-
sions would not appear to restrict managements ability to introduce new 
equipment and procédures. Précise définitions of technological change were 
absent and most agreements did not go beyond minimum requirements for 
notice specified in the Canada Labour Code. Retraining, where mentioned, 
was called for in terms sufficiently gênerai to permit a good deal of man-
agement latitude. 
In other areas related to job protection, clauses restricting management 
flexibility were the exception rather than the rule, and where included were 
not well defined. For example, the collective agreement between the Bank 
of Nova Scotia, (Tweed, Ontario) and the Retail Clerks required only that 
the employer "not utilize part time employées for the sole purpose of sub-
verting the membership of the union". 
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Contracts in the crédit unions, U.S. institutions, and the City and 
District, on the other hand, contained more extensive and more restrictive 
provisions with respect to job protection. Approximately, one quarter of 
the crédit union contracts prohibited subcontracting and one third of the 
U.S. agreements as well as the City and District contract enjoined supervi-
sors on performing work normally assigned to bargaining unit members. 
There were also constraints on the use of part-time and casual employées. 
The City and District contract allowed part-time employées only in the 
lowest classification. Restrictions in U.S. agreements included stipulations 
not to hire part-time employées where it was possible to employ a full-time 
person, limitations on the number of part-time employées permitted per 
branch, requirements that in the event of layoffs ail part-time employées 
would be laid off before the first full-time employée, and spécification of 
where and when part-time employées could be used (e.g. Saturdays). Re-
strictions on casual employées usually took the form of a requirement that a 
casual employée automatically become a permanent employée after a cer-
tain time period; the City & District contract further specified that the pro-
portion of casual employées could not exceed three percent of the total bar-
gaining unit and 20 percent within any single branch. 
Benefits 
None of the contracts specified, in détail, benefits for which unionized 
employées were eligible (e.g. médical insurance, dental plans). At most 
memoranda of agreement were included that stipulated that unionized em-
ployées would receive the same level of benefits (with the same employer/ 
employée sharing formula) accorded to employées in other branches. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
Several additional aspects of the agreements were noteworthy. Given 
the large proportion of women employées, maternity leave provisions are of 
spécial importance. Ail twelve contracts provided for such leave with the 
overwhelming majority guaranteeing a job at the same pay upon termina-
tion of the leave. 
It goes without saying that a major conséquence of unionization is the 
introduction of grievance procédures culminating in arbitration. A marked 
préférence was demonstrated for tripartite arbitration panels. Half of the 
contracts permitted a single arbitrator if both parties mutually agreed. 
Finally, the contracts tended to be one year in duration. 
In summary, our analysis indicates that the collective agreements nego-
tiated thus far can only be characterized as "weak" from a union perspec-
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tive. They provide little of the systematic protection and few of the benefits 
which are commonplace in other sectors and are significantly less developed 
than agreements examined in other financial organizations in Canada and 
United States. Contract provisions in many instances simply codify existing 
practices long in place, rarely breaking new ground. New procédures which 
are introduced can only be regarded as "minimal" when compared to 
clauses elsewhere. Finally, many agreements simply are silent on issues that 
lie at the heart of most collective agreements (e.g. job posting). 
This expérience may reflect the relative newness of bargaining; it often 
takes several rounds of bargaining to establish well articulated contractual 
procédures. However, the second agreements included in the sample show 
little development in this regard. A more likely explanation is that the rela-
tively weak contracts negotiated thus far confirm the statement made by a 
CLC officiai that branch-by-branch certification left unionized branches 
with little bargaining power. Collective agreements thus are unlikely to im-
prove from the union's perspective until unions are able to exert more bar-
gaining pressure than at présent. 
DISCUSSION 
Many of the practical issues posed by the ongoing developments in 
banking are self-evident. The Canadian banking industry is a crucial actor 
within the business community. It provides savings and loans facilities to 
millions of individuals, and is a major employer. The extent to which a 
unionized work force, or the threat of one, means significant changes in 
profitability, operating procédures, or employment procédures is of ob-
vious importance. A 1977 report by Burns Fry limited, for exarnple, stated 
that every one per cent increase in wages would reduce bank earnings by 1.6 
per cent56. Expérience in other industries has shown, however, that prédic-
tions of this kind must be made very cautiously, especially if the labour-
management relationship is not yet a mature one. Studies demonstrate that 
the link between the rates of change of wages and earnings is by no means 
straightforward or stable over time57. Furthermore, the impact of unions on 
wages is difficult to isolate in the first place, and varies considerably by in-
dustry58. Dire management prédictions about the adverse effects of 
56 " L a b o u r Unions and Chartered B a n k s " , Investment Notes, Burns Fry Limited, Oc-
tober 1977. 
57 See, Albert REES, The Economies of Trade Unions, Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962; F. Ray MARSHALL, Allan M. CARTTER and Alan KING, Labor 
Economies, Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, 1976. 
58 See H.M. LEVINSON, Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining, New 
York: Wiley and Sons, 1966; Lawrence KAHN, "Unionism and Relative Wages: Direct and 
Indirect Effects", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 1979, pp. 
520-532. 
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unionism on operating procédures also may be prématuré. The analysis of 
bank contracts suggested that collective agreements in Canadian banks pro-
bably will not differ markedly from those in thousands of unionized enter-
prises across the country. While some flexibility may be lost, no cataclysmic 
changes should be anticipated. 
But rather than necessitating a reliance on spéculation, the nascent 
stage of bank unionism and its slow pace provides the opportunity to ex-
amine union impact empirically. Most studies of union impact hâve been 
rétrospective analyses, relying on information collected after collective bar-
gaining has been firmly established59. The way in which unionism in Cana-
dian banking is evolving should permit a longitudinal research strategy, 
enabling data collection and analysis at early, intermediate, and later stages 
in the unionization process. Thus it should be possible to generate testable 
hypothèses and to employ "before-after" measures in investigating a 
number of issues. 
Work Attitudes and Behaviour 
One issue that warrants attention concerns the effect of unionization 
on employée work attitudes and behaviour. Behavioural scientists hâve long 
been cognizant of the close relationship between job requirements and non-
task oriented employée behaviour. Relationships hâve also been established 
between unionization and work attitudes60. If unionism spreads and is ac-
companied (as expected) by changes in work week, responsibilities, reward 
structures and promotion opportunities, a variety of work areas will be af-
fected. Will the way in which employées relate to customers change? Will 
daily work relationships among employées be altered? To what extent will 
employée satisfaction be affected? Will turnover rates increase or decrease? 
What will be the impact on job performance? Clearly, ascertaining the spé-
cifie behavioural and attitudinal effects of unionism will not be easy and 
will be subject to situational contingencies61. But answering thèse questions 
is of critical importance if the ramifications of unionism for employée be-
haviour are to be understood. 
59 JURIS , Harvey, and Peter F E U I L L E , Police Unionism, Lexington, Mass . , Lexington 
Books, 1973; David STANLEY, Managing Local Government under Union Pressure, 
Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1972; S. S L I C H T E R , J . H E A L L Y and E. 
L IVERNASH, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management, Washington, The 
Brookings Institution, 1960. 
60 H A M M E R , W . C . , and F.I . S M I T H , " W o r k Atti tudes as Prédiction of Union Activi-
t y " , Journal of Applied Psychology, 1978, 64(4), 415-421; J . G E T M A N , S. G O L D B E R G and 
J. H E R M A N , Union Représentation Elections: Law and Reality, New York, Russell Sage 
Foundat ion , 1976. 
6i P O R T E R , L .W. , E .E . L A W L E R II I , and R . J . H A C K M A N , Behavior in Organiza-
tions, New York, McGraw-Hil l , 1975; V A N M A A N E N , J . , "Breaking In: Socialization in 
W o r k " , in I.R. Dubin (éd.) Handbook of Work, Organization and Society, Chicago, Rand-
McNally, 1975; S C H E I N , E . H . , "Organiza t ion , Socialization and the Profession of Manage-
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28 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 1 (1981) 
Distribution of Managerial Authority and Power 
Intra-organizational division of power and managerial authority is a 
second area of union impact that could be investigated. The amount of de 
facto authority held by branch management may be greater than depicted 
by company organization charts and personnel manuals. Unioni2,ation may 
resuit not only in more délégation of authority to the branch level but also 
in the decentralization of more formai authority, especially with respect to 
grievance handling. What effect will this hâve on the functional relation-
ships between the national or régional offices and the various branches in a 
given région, particularly if several branches in a région are organized by 
différent unions? Internally, the branch manager typically delegates most 
aspects of employée relations to the branch accountant. Under unionization 
will the branch manager be obliged to play a greater rôle in employée related 
activities and décisions? To what extent can informai personnel arrange-
ments which hâve evolved coexist with collective bargaining? 
Will the net effect be that branch management has to be re-socialized 
into new rôles in the bank organization; a process involving learning new 
job values, adjusting to a modified work environment and developing the 
managerial skills necessary to cope with altered managerial rôles? There has 
already been considérable work done in describing the phases and activities 
of the sociahzation process. Recently, Feldman has modelled, the process 
and tested some of the relationship between socialization outcomes (e.g. 
mutual influences, internai work motivation and job involvement) and 
prior process variables (e.g. rôle définition and initiation to the task)62. His 
model seems particularly appropriate to the study of possible changes in the 
managerial functions, responsibility, and authority of branch management 
in the face of a union campaign. 
Corporate Response to Transition 
Attention can be directed, as well, toward the manner in which top 
management administers the transition to unionization. Field research 
undertaken by Murray63 traced a system-wide development of commercial 
lending programs for minorities in two large U.S. commercial banks. A 
62 F E L D M E N , D . C . , " A Contingency Theory of Social izat ion", Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 1976, 21 , 433-452. 
63 MURRAY JR., E.A., "The Social Response Process in Commercial Banks: An Em-
pirical Investigation", Academy of Management Review, 1976, 1, 5-15. 
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multiphased process of corporate response was documented and a number 
of impediments to organizational adaptability were identified. As Murray 
observes: 
...[Bank] managers are, by and large, accustomed to handling certain 
types of risk (crédit risk, liquidity risk, etc.), but social policy represents 
the introduction of genuine change in basic values, assumptions, and 
potentially the bank's very structure and opérations... The challenge is to 
détermine how the effectiveness of change can be preserved without dis-
rupting traditional économie efficiency64. 
The corporate response process revealed through Murray's study offers 
a promising way of looking at organizational response to change because it 
permits the systematic mapping of organizational phenomena at several 
organizational levels over time. 
Labour Movement Conséquences 
Less visible than the impact on banking and its employées are the con-
séquences of the bank campaign for organized labour in Canada. Canadian 
unions historically hâve held limited appeal to white-collar employées ex-
cept those in the public sector; estimâtes place the proportion of unionized 
private sector white-collar employées at under ten per cent65. As the shift of 
the labour force from secondary to the tertiary sector proceeds unabated, 
Canadian unions either must learn to attract white-collar employées or face 
a long-run diminution in membership and ultimately in power. 
Past efforts by the Canadian Labour Congress to mount successful 
white-collar campaigns hâve failed. A National Committee on White-Collar 
Organization was established by the CLC in 1962. Composed of one repré-
sentative from each CLC affiliate interested in white-collar workers, the 
committee engaged in éducation, research, and coordination activities but 
made no discernible inroads in the private sector66. Switching to more direct 
tactics in 1972, the CLC formed a directly chartered affiliate, the Associa-
tion of Commercial and Technical Employées67. After two years, an expen-
sive, well-publicized organizing campaign ended with less than 200 white-
collar workers under collective agreements68. 
64 Ibid. 
65 P H I L L I P S , Gerald E . , Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining, To ron to , 
Butterworth, 1977, p . 30. 
66 Canadian Labour: M a y 1962, p . 26; M a y 1964, p p . 33-34; Ju ly-Augus t 1965, p . 29; 
M a y 1966, p . 50; M a y 1968, p p . 51-52; J u n e 1970, p . 4 1 ; Apr i l 1971, p p . 4-6. 
67 Canadian Labour, M a r c h 1973, p p . 3-5; 24. 
68 LIST, Wilfred, "CLC Drive Fails to Win White-Collar Workers", The Globe and 
Mail, November 28, 1974: excerpted in John Crispo, The Canadian Industrial Relations 
System, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978, p. 142. 
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To what extent hâve unions in Canada learned from earlier failures? 
Will reliance be placed on conventional tactics which produced inadéquate 
results in the past or will new, perhaps innovative, organizing approaches be 
developed? SORWUC, for example, attributed its initial success to its femi-
nist orientation and to the fact that it was a union run by women. Are there 
lessons for the other unions involved? If so, how adaptable are the more 
established organizations, such as the Retail Clerks, to contingencies of this 
type? 
Examination of thèse questions is important. Banks employ the largest 
identifiable bloc of non-union white-collar workers in the country. Pénétra-
tion of the banks by unions would not only contribute substantially to 
union strength, but could set the kind of example that white-collar workers 
in other industries would follow. Union failure in the bank sector, on the 
other hand, would tend to reinforce its image of inef fectiveness in the white-
collar arena, making future white-collar campaigns more difficult. 
Attraction to unionization 
Related to questions of labour*s ability or inability to organize bank 
employées is the more fundamental issue of "why workers unionize". Why 
hâve employées at some banks proven more union prone than others; within 
a given bank, why hâve employées at some branches accepted unionism, 
while employées in other branches hâve rejected it? To what degree do fac-
tors such as branch size, urban-rural-suburban location, employée turn-
over, male-female ratio, degree of automation, and proportion of part-time 
employées systematically relate to union pénétration? Which management 
policies are effective in combatting unionism; which policies hâve no effect 
— or the opposite effect? Reciprocally, what stratégies adopted by various 
unions appeal to bank employées, or regardless of strategy, are some union 
organizations simply more attractive to bank employées than others? 
The branch-by-branch organization pattern and the number of dif-
férent unions and banks involved create idéal conditions for answering 
thèse questions and indeed, such investigation already has begun. Lowe69 
found that dissatisfaction with wages, promotion opportunities, and work-
load prompted initial interest in unionization but that it took several spé-
cifie incidents combined with the active support of an established union to 
translate the union interest into concrète action. Thèse incidents included 
the appointment of an unpopular accountant, instances of perceived mis-
treatment of employées by management, and a smaller wage increase than 
anticipated. Once an application for certification was filed, Lowe suggested 
69 LOWE, "The Canadian Union of Bank Employées". 
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that management response, branch size, and employée career orientation 
were the most important factors in determining whether the certification ac-
tually resulted or not. The study also identified the small town community 
environment as an influential factor in ail phases of the unionization 
activity. 
In conclusion, ongoing development will create many more research 
challenges beyond the few touched upon hère. Taking advantage of them 
will not only help answer the question of "whither bank unionism,,, but 
also should increase our understanding of important industrial relations 
phenomena in gênerai. Certainly research on banking union impact and 
why employées join or do not join bank unions is capable of providing in-
sight in both regards. Should bank unionism become widespread, questions 
relating to évolution of bargaining structure and déterminants of bargaining 
outcomes and processes would seem to be especially relevant. Furthermore, 
the possibility of researchers beginning their investigations while bank 
unionism is in its infancy provides research design opportunities rarely 
found in other settings and should enhance the practical and theoretical 
value of what is learned. 
La syndicalisation des employés de banque 
Perspectives et résultats 
En 1977, le Conseil canadien des relations du travail a commencé à accréditer les 
syndicats des employés de banques à charte. Depuis cette date, plusieurs syndicats et 
le Congrès du travail du Canada ont lancé des campagnes de recrutement parmi les 
employés des banques. Cependant, la syndicalisation de ces employés est encore dans 
les langes quoique cette tendance ait été favorisée par le mouvement féministe de la 
décennie 1970, l'automatisation des opérations bancaires et la syndicalisation des 
employés de bureau en général. 
Le syndicalisme réussira-t-il ou non à s'implanter dans les banques? Si oui, quel 
effet aura-t-il sur le fonctionnement de ces institutions? Quels inconvénients 
pourrait-il avoir pour le public? Autant de questions sur lesquelles on possède peu 
d'information. 
LE MILIEU BANCAIRE 
Jetons d'abord un coup d'oeil sur le milieu bancaire. Les banques à charte cana-
diennes emploient plus de 150 000 personnes. Si l'on y ajoute les autres institutions 
d'épargne et de crédit, le nombre en est porté à 175 000. Les banques à charte fonc-
tionnent à partir de succursales locales et, pour sa part, par exemple, la Banque 
Royale du Canada en compte 1 500 disséminées à la grandeur du pays. D'un autre 
côté, il n'y a en moyenne qu'une vingtaine d'employés par succursale, alors que les 
sièges sociaux et les bureaux régionaux peuvent en compter des centaines. 
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Dans la succursale, en règle générale, ce sont le gérant et le comptable qui 
détiennent l'autorité administrative. L'exercice de l'autorité et l'application des poli-
tiques du personnel sont plus ou moins décentralisées. Les salaires, les heures de 
travail et les conditions de travail sont établis dans chaque banque sur une base na-
tionale ou régionale. Le recrutement dans les centres urbains est sous la responsa-
bilité de bureaux destinés à cette fin. En ce qui regarde le maintien de la discipline, les 
promotions et les mutations, la direction locale n'a qu'un pouvoir de recommanda-
tion. Les négociations collectives sont dirigées par des représentants du siège social 
ou des bureaux régionaux assistés de consultants en relations professionnelles et 
d'avocats spécialisés en droit du travail, même si le gérant de succursale assiste aux 
pourparlers et même si les conventions collectives désignent la direction de la succur-
sale comme représentant de l'employeur aux deux premiers stades du règlement des 
griefs. 
Quant au personnel d'exécution, il est principalement formé de caissiers (25%), 
de commis (25%), et de secrétaires (10°7o). Ces fonctions sont en très grande majorité 
(97%) occupées par des femmes. Par contre, il n'y a que 4% des gérants de succur-
sales qui sont des femmes. En 1975, 75% des femmes gagnaient moins de $8 000. par 
année en comparaison de 10% des hommes. Aussi, ne faut-il pas se surprendre que le 
roulement de la main-d'oeuvre soit élevé. 
LA QUESTION DE L'UNITÉ DE NÉGOCIATION 
La description des unités de négociation est d'importance primordiale. Celle-ci 
revêt deux aspects. Il fallait à la fois en tracer les limites extérieures et les frontières 
intérieures. Concernant l'étendue des unités de négociation, le Conseil canadien a 
non seulement décrété que la succursale prise individuellement était une unité appro-
priée, mais il a rejeté le bien-fondé d'une unité de négociation nationale ou provin-
ciale en expliquant que les critères de la localisation constituaient une unité naturelle 
de négociation, qu'il convenait d'établir des unités de négociation aptes à faciliter la 
négociation collective, que des unités trop extensives dans des secteurs inorganisés 
ont pour résultat de bloquer toute négociation. Ces considérations ont réussi à 
repousser les arguments des banques qui s'appuyaient sur la commodité adminis-
trative, la désirabilité d'établir des conditions d'emploi identiques et la confusion 
possible qui pouvait découler de la prolifération des unités de négociation pour jus-
tifier des unités de négociation plus vastes. 
L'établissement des frontières à l'intérieur des succursales a aussi posé certains 
problèmes. Le Conseil a décidé d'inclure dans l'unité de négociation tous les em-
ployés à l'exception des gérants et des comptables, c'est-à-dire tout le personnel 
d'exécution, y compris les préposés au crédit et aux prêts, mais il a décidé d'exclure 
les employés intermittents à temps partiel. 
D'une façon générale, les décisions visaient à favoriser l'organisation, mais 
l'établissement d'unités de négociation par succursale est une épée à deux tranchants: 
si elle favorise l'organisation dans l'immédiat, elle affaiblit le syndicat à la table de 
négociations en rendant l'utilisation de la grève difficile. De même, les banques esti-
ment que cette forme de négociation peut être coûteuse et presque impossible à coor-
donner. 
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L'ACTION SYNDICALE DANS LES BANQUES 
Au cours des trois dernières années, même s'il y a eu passablement d'activité 
dans le secteur bancaire, tout au plus 2% des succursales ont été touchées par des re-
quêtes en accréditation. De juin 1976 à janvier 1980, on a relevé 138 requêtes en ac-
créditation, touchant en moyenne 18.5% des employés, qui ont donné lieu à 102 ac-
créditations, 29 rejets et 6 désistements, alors qu'une requête est pendante. Par ail-
leurs, durant la même période, il y a eu 29 révocations. Ces requêtes provenaient de 
la plupart des provinces, mais se concentraient surtout en Colombie Britannique 
(51), en Ontario (38) et au Québec (33). Huit syndicats différents ont présenté ces re-
quêtes et la plupart des banques à charte ont été touchées, la Banque de Montréal ve-
nant en tête de liste. L'expérience jusqu'à aujourd'hui démontre que l'organisation 
progresse lentement, que le taux des accréditations par rapport aux requêtes présen-
tées va s'accroissant, que les campagnes d'organisation se situent principalement en 
Colombie Britannique, en Ontario et au Québec, que toutes les banques ont été tou-
chées et que quatre syndicats surtout font montre d'activité dans ce secteur. Les 
employés des succursales peu importantes montrent aussi une plus grande solidarité. 
LE CONTENU DES CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES 
L'analyse d'un certain nombre de conventions collectives négociées et conclues 
au cours de ces trois ou quatre ans permet de constater qu'elles comportent à peu 
près le même contenu que celles des autres secteurs d'activité: sécurité syndicale, 
horaires de travail, promotion, mise à pied et mutation, protection de l'emploi, 
avantages sociaux, etc. D'un point de vue syndical, ces conventions collectives lais-
sent plutôt à désirer. Elles n'assurent pas une protection systématique aux employés 
et ne contiennent pas des avantages aussi marqués que ceux qu'on retrouve dans 
d'autres institutions financières au Canada et aux États-Unis. Dans bien des cas, ces 
conventions collectives ne font que codifier les pratiques déjà existantes. On n'y 
remarque que peu d'innovations. Enfin, plusieurs d'entre elles restent silencieuses 
sur des sujets qui sont au coeur même d'un régime normal de conventions collectives. 
L'expérience permet de se rendre compte que l'on est au point de départ d'un 
processus nouveau de négociations collectives et qu'il faut souvent plusieurs rondes 
de négociations pour établir des mécanismes contractuels bien articulés. Pourtant, 
les deuxièmes conventions ne présentent guère de progrès si on les compare aux pre-
mières. Cette constatation tend à confirmer le point de vue d'un représentant du 
Congrès du travail du Canada lequel soutient que la négociation au niveau de la suc-
cursale laisse aux syndicats peu de force économique. Les conventions collectives ne 
paraissent pas devoir s'améliorer tant que les syndicats ne seront pas en mesure de 
mettre plus de pression sur les employeurs. 
LES CONSÉQUENCES DE LA SYNDICALISATION 
En ce qui concerne le milieu bancaire lui-même, la syndicalisation des employés 
soulève nombre de questions auxquelles seul l'avenir permettra d'apporter des 
réponses. En effet, si elle réussit, quelle en sera la répercussion sur les attitudes et les 
comportements des employés auprès de la clientèle? Quel effet aura-t-elle sur l'exer-
cice de l'autorité? Favorisera-t-elle une délégation de pouvoir plus étendue entre les 
mains de la direction des succursales? Quelles conséquences aura-t-elle sur les rela-
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tions entre la succursale d'une part, et les bureaux régionaux et les sièges sociaux 
d'autre part? Comment la haute administration réagira-t-elle face à la pénétration 
des syndicats? 
De même, la réussite ou l'échec de la syndicalisation de cette catégorie d'em-
ployés pourra avoir des conséquences sur le mouvement syndical lui-même. On sait 
que, hormis le secteur public, les syndicats canadiens n'ont eu que peu d'activité 
auprès des cols blancs en général, car moins de 10% de ces derniers en sont membres. 
À mesure que le secteur tertiaire se développe aux dépens des secteurs primaire et 
secondaire, les syndicats canadiens doivent apprendre à attirer les employés de 
bureau ou bien ils subiront avec le temps une baisse d'effectifs et une perte d'in-
fluence. C'est pourquoi, considérant que les banques emploient le plus gros bloc 
identifiable de cols blancs, la pénétration des syndicats parmi les employés de banque 
pourrait avoir un effet d'entraînement auprès de la masse énorme de cols blancs non 
syndiqués au pays. Si cette entreprise est au contraire un échec, la syndicalisation de 
cette catégorie d'employés pourrait être rendue encore plus difficile. 
Il faudra donc suivre de près cette entreprise relativement nouvelle, car elle 
pourrait avoir de profondes répercussions, non seulement sur le fonctionnement des 
institutions bancaires elles-mêmes, mais aussi sur l'évolution du syndicalisme et des 
relations professionnelles en général. 
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